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Agile cryptography allows for a resource-efficient swap of a cryptographic core in case the security
of an underlying classical cryptographic algorithm becomes compromised. In this paper, we suggest
how this principle can be applied to the field of quantum cryptography. We explicitly demonstrate
two quantum cryptographic protocols: quantum digital signatures (QDS) and quantum secret shar-
ing (QSS), on the same hardware sender and receiver platform, with protocols only differing in
their classical post-processing. The system is also suitable for quantum key distribution (QKD)
and is highly compatible with deployed telecommunication infrastructures, since it uses standard
quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) encoding and heterodyne detection. For the first time, QDS
protocols are modified to allow for postselection at the receiver, enhancing protocol performance.
The cryptographic primitives QDS and QSS are inherently multipartite and we prove that they are
secure not only when a player internal to the task is dishonest, but also when (external) eavesdrop-
ping on the quantum channel is allowed. In the first proof-of-principle demonstration of an agile
quantum communication system, the quantum states were distributed at GHz rates. This allows for
a one-bit message to be securely signed using our QDS protocols in less than 0.05 ms over a 2 km
fiber link and in less than 0.2 s over a 20 km fiber link. To our knowledge, this also marks the first
demonstration of a continuous-variable direct QSS protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, cryptography has been threatened
by advances in mathematics, computational power and
side channel attacks, and may soon be threatened by
quantum computers. The breaking of a cryptosystem,
i.e. a suite of cryptographic algorithms and hardware
needed to implement a particular security service, usu-
ally triggered the development of new algorithms. These
would subsequently be tested and hardened for years be-
fore they could finally be deployed into real world appli-
cations to secure our ever-growing digital infrastructure.
The redeployment of cryptographic soft- and hard-ware
is a costly endeavor.
In the past decade, crypto-agility has emerged as a
prospective solution to this problem [1]. One of the core
ideas of crypto-agility is to provide a middleware with a
two-way interface between the software application layer
and the crypto-core or algorithm of the cryptosystem,
Fig. 1 (a). Whenever a new attack vector emerges, the
deployed architecture may stay in place and only the vul-
nerable crypto-core is replaced. This saves valuable de-
ployment time as well as costs to re-engineer the whole
system. The technical challenge is to design the middle-
ware flexible enough to support novel crypto-cores.
We suggest a concept of quantum crypto-agility for
quantum communication. Just like the quantum com-
puter hardware provides qubits and gates to run differ-
ent quantum algorithms on it, we propose that quantum
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communication hardware may support a diverse range of
quantum communication protocols on it. This provides
an abstraction layer between quantum-enabled hardware
and the post-processing stack necessary to realize a quan-
tum communication protocol.
In this paper we explore this concept of agile quantum
communication and present an experimental demonstra-
tion of the first “seed” system featuring quantum crypto-
agility. Specifically, we investigate continuous-variable
quantum digital signatures (CV QDS), quantum secret
sharing (CV QSS) and quantum key distribution (CV
QKD) on a common platform. The secure protocols
comprising this agile system use standard telecom sender
and receiver techniques making the system immediately
compatible with deployed infrastructures, be it fiber net-
works or free-space links, and capable of high sending
rates. Quantum coherent states, randomly chosen from
an alphabet of four possible phases, are sent through a
fiber-optic link. Highly efficient heterodyne detection is
used at the receiver.
This first proof-of-principle agile quantum communi-
cation system is thus capable to perform three different
quantum cryptographic protocols, QDS, QSS, and QKD
using the same sending and receiving hardware for all
protocols. The employed physical system and the ad-
vances made in the security proofs of the protocols al-
low for an implementation compatible with telecom net-
works. Along with the agility aspect, this work marks
the first demonstration of our CV QSS scheme and the
first demonstration of a CV QDS system with GHz send-
ing rates and record speed to sign a one-bit message.
Our demonstration thus provides a step towards a full
quantum crypto-agility, in which several different quan-
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2tum cryptographic protocols may be implemented on the
same hardware deployment with alterations only at the
level of classical postprocessing.
Our paper is outlined as follows. In Sec. II, we pro-
pose and discuss two alternative formulations of quan-
tum crypto-agility, and show that existing trends in the
QKD and QDS literature may be interpreted as one such
formulation. In Sec. III we discuss three cryptographic
tasks, QDS, QSS and QKD, and introduce several secure
protocols which rely on the same physical setups. These
protocols are implemented in Sec. IV and the resulting
key rates and figures of merit are displayed in Sec. V. We
believe this demonstrates a crucial proof-of-principle step
towards full quantum crypto-agility. Finally, we discuss
our achievements through the lens of agility in Sec. VI.
II. QUANTUM CRYPTO-AGILITY
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FIG. 1. Comparison between classical crypto-agility and
the proposed agile quantum cryptography architecture. (a)
Classical Crypto-Agility: Different classical cryptographic al-
gorithms, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic-
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE), Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES), One-time Pad (OTP) or Post-Quantum Cryp-
tography (PQC) can be flexibly combined on the same hard-
ware platform. A network interface card (NIC) is used to
send and receive secure communication. (b) QKD-Assisted
Crypto-Agility: Classical cryptographic algorithms make use
of a pool of secret keys generated by a QKD crypto core. The
quantum functionality is tied to the hardware implementa-
tion and cannot easily be upgraded, e.g. to perform quantum
digital signatures (QDS) or quantum secret sharing (QSS).
(c) Quantum Crypto-Agility: Classical cryptographic algo-
rithms and different quantum protocols can be swapped out
and combined as necessary, requiring no changes to the un-
derlying hardware architecture.
Classical crypto-agility is described pictorially in
Fig. 1(a), in which a potentially vulnerable crypto-core
may be readily replaced without affecting the rest of the
deployed system. The encrypted communication is then
sent on the hardware level via a network interface card
(NIC). We suggest here two different approaches to con-
sider a quantum cryptosystem as agile.
One can think of a first type of agility as crypto-agility
assisted by QKD. Here a QKD system acts as a black box
that delivers fresh shared keys to classical cryptography
applications, see Fig. 1(b). The advantage is that the
middleware does not have to care about key generation
and the QKD protocol itself. The downside is that the
QKD system may not be reused to run any other quan-
tum protocol on it, meaning that the agility is confined
completely to the classical realm, with the hardware and
quantum crypto-core being fixed.
The second approach, quantum crypto-agility, is de-
picted in Fig. 1(c). Compared to the first approach, the
QKD system is replaced by a quantum network inter-
face card (QNIC). The QNIC is able to perform multiple
quantum communication protocols (e.g. QDS, QSS or
QKD) on the same hardware platform. It communicates
its hardware capabilities through an interface to the pro-
tocol layer, where the matching protocol for the user task
at hand is chosen. A concrete example for such a layer
stack is shown in Fig. 2. Note that here the choice of a
particular quantum cryptographic application is reduced
merely to a software and/or firmware update. Such a
quantum agile crypto-system carries direct analogy with
the classical agile crypto-system of Fig. 1: hardware and
agile interface stay the same and only the crypto-core,
classical, as in Fig. 1(a), or quantum, as in Fig. 1(c),
changes. This second approach to agility can be thought
of as a choice of quantum “app”.
This approach carries an advantage of economic use
of resources. QKD requires resource-intensive post-
processing to generate a secure key, and real channel
parameters (e. g., noise, losses) may be too restrictive
to allow for efficient secret key distillation. Some tasks,
however, can be performed directly without first gener-
ating a shared secure key via QKD. A good example are
QDS protocols, in which a secure signature is created
straight from a raw quantum state exchange, consuming
fewer resources than an equivalent QKD protocol [2].
It is important to realize that the transfer of the
crypto-agility idea to the field of quantum cryptogra-
phy changes its meaning, as the security of the quan-
tum crypto-core can be proven information-theoretically.
However, considering practical implementation security
and the emergence of novel quantum cryptographic pro-
tocols and performance improvements to existing ones,
an agile strategy seems prudent.
Quantum crypto-agility may also be a relevant topic
for ongoing standardization efforts, such as the ETSI
QKD ISG 004 and 014 standards [3, 4] that define the
interface between applications and key providers such as
a key management system or QKD systems. However,
the agility aspect has not been necessarily recognized and
highlighted there. Notably, to our knowledge, neither CV
3nor DV based systems capable of selectively performing
several different quantum primitives on the same hard-
ware have been demonstrated so far. In the remainder
of this paper we will thus exclusively consider the sec-
ond type of quantum crypto-agility, Fig. 1 (c), which will
be preferable in situations where full QKD is either not
possible or not necessary.
III. BEYOND QKD: SIGNATURES AND
SECRETS
In addition to the usual bipartite QKD, and in order
to make our notion of quantum crypto-agility concrete,
we consider the following multipartite tasks:
QDS - quantum digital signatures: allows for the
secure authentication of a classical message. It has been
shown that because of its small overhead, QDS may run
over channels for which QKD is insecure [2].
QSS - quantum secret sharing: allows for the se-
cure distribution of a classical secret among a conspiracy
of potentially dishonest recipients.
In the spirit of quantum crypto-agility introduced ear-
lier, Figs. 1 (c), 2, we explicitly propose two communica-
tion systems, i.e. configurations of the same underlying
hardware, which can each fulfill multiple quantum cryp-
tographic tasks. The two systems may thus both be con-
sidered as agile, and we denote them QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-
QPSK and QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK, see Fig. 3. The
labels indicate which cryptographic tasks (QDS, QSS or
QKD) they support; the underlying quantum states that
they use (a continuous-variable CV-QPSK alphabet);
and in which direction (f - “forward” or b -“backward”)
the quantum states are exchanged. Labeling agile quan-
tum cryptosystems by the hardware components they are
based on and the protocols they support might prove use-
ful in later efforts to standardize interfaces and provide
some comparability between different implementations.
Note that the use of the QPSK alphabet and het-
erodyne detection renders our system highly compatible
with standard telecom infrastructure, potentially paving
a way to integrating quantum agile systems into deployed
communication links which run with up to 100 GHz send-
ing rate [5, 6]. With this in mind, the protocols pre-
sented here sit within the field of continuous-variable
(CV) quantum cryptography, which aims towards fast
sending rates over metropolitan distances. The four indi-
vidual protocols each provide asymptotic security against
a dishonest player performing a collective beamsplitter
or entangling-cloner attack. Descriptions of each proto-
col and key details in their security proofs are sketched
below, while the reader is referred to the appendices for
technical details.
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FIG. 2. Concrete example for a layer-based view of the ag-
ile system QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK presented in this work.
Quantum crypto-agility can be realized by the introduction
of a middleware acting as an interface between the user appli-
cation (yellow) and quantum hardware (purple) layers. This
requires that the hardware exposes a set of standardized ca-
pabilities or functions to the layers above. The middleware
would then manage the selection of suitable quantum crypto-
graphic primitives and hardware-compatible protocols to ful-
fill a given user request for cryptographic tasks. In this man-
ner, the agile middleware generalizes and extends the func-
tions of a key management system (KMS). For some of the
acronyms occurring in this figure, please refer to the caption
of Fig. 1. CV-I/Q-TX and CV-I/Q-RX denote sender (TX)
and receiver (RX) hardware modules capable of performing
continuous-variable (CV) I/Q modulation and detection.
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FIG. 3. The sender (Tx) and and receiver (Rx) mod-
ules may be reconfigured to make Alice either the sender
(“f -configuration”) or receiver (“b-configuration”) of quan-
tum states. Each setup may be considered agile, since once
either the f - or b-configuration is chosen, multiple different
cryptographic tasks may be performed.
A. First agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK
The first agile system we consider relies on the b-
configuration, with Bob and Charlie as the senders (Tx)
of quantum states, while Alice performs heterodyne de-
tection (Rx), Fig. 3. This QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK sys-
tem is capable of performing both QDS and QSS tasks
via the protocols QDS-b and QSS-b, which are described
below. Our experiment, detailed in Section IV, marks
the first demonstration of CV QDS over insecure quan-
tum channels.
1. The QDS-b protocol
The very first QDS scheme was proposed in Ref. [7] and
required a quantum memory. In the last two decades,
discrete-variable (DV) QDS protocols have first lifted
this requirement [8–11] and then also have lifted the
need for a trusted quantum channel [2, 12], and have
brought their hardware requirements closer to those of
QKD [13]. Recently, DV QDS implementations based on
deployed networks have been demonstrated successfully
over metropolitan distances [14–17]. Indeed, in several
QDS papers, a nascent form of quantum agility is men-
tioned, either explicity [14, 16, 18] or implicitly [15, 17],
but so far the comparison has always been that the dis-
tribution of quantum states for QDS is analogous–or
in some cases identical–to that required for QKD. For
example, Ref. [14] differs from differential-phase-shift
QKD only in post-processing. Similarly, one protocol
in Ref. [13] is designed specifically to share sender and
receiver with QKD, while another requires first full QKD
and then classical communication to sign a message. De-
spite these recognitions, to our knowledge the full utility
of applying the idea of quantum crypto-agility to a de-
ployed quantum network has not yet been explored, nor
have additional cryptographic protocols been studied in
this framework.
Unlike those preceding QDS protocols, in which Alice
was the sender of quantum states, in QDS-b Bob and
Charlie are the senders of quantum states, while Alice
is the recipient, Fig. 3 (b). This allows QDS-b to be
performed on our first agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-
QPSK.
The protocol QDS-b runs as follows:
1) For each future messagem ∈ {0, 1}, which Alice wishes
to securely sign, Bob and Charlie both send Alice a se-
quence, length L, of coherent states chosen randomly
from the QPSK alphabet. Bob and Charlie each keep
a record of which states they have sent.
2) Alice performs heterodyne detection on each received
state, and forms eliminated signatures AmB,C by writing
down which two states from QPSK are least compati-
ble with her measurement outcome, that is, which states
have the smallest conditional probability of being sent.
3) Bob and Charlie swap a random half of their signa-
ture elements in order to guard against dishonest Al-
ice. Bob (Charlie) now possesses signatures XmB , (X
m
C ),
which consists of two halves of length L/2, one of which
was generated by Bob (Charlie), and one of which was
received during the swapping.
4) Later, Alice sends her message m and the correspond-
ing AmB,C , first to Bob. Bob compares his record of which
states were sent, and counts the number of mismatches.
A mismatch occurs if Alice claims to have eliminated a
state which Bob indeed did send. Provided that there
are sufficiently few mismatches, he accepts m as genuine
and forwards to Charlie, who likewise accepts or rejects
by counting the number of mismatches.
A QDS scheme must be secure against both forging
attacks, in which a dishonest Bob will attempt to con-
vince Charlie that a message is genuine; and repudiation
attacks, in which a dishonest Alice will attempt to force
Bob and Charlie to disagree about the message’s validity.
Furthermore, noting that a QDS protocol which declares
all possible signatures as fake may be considered trivially
secure, we require that the protocol should succeed if all
parties are honest, that is, it should be robust.
The full security proof of QDS-b may be found in Ap-
pendix A. Here we simply note that security against
forgery is guaranteed by picking a highly non-orthogonal
alphabet of coherent states, i.e. the amplitude of the
QPSK alphabet should be sufficiently small.
The main security result for QDS-b is the following
expression for the binary entropy h
h (pe) ≥ 1− χ (1)
of a forging Bob’s probability pe to induce a mismatch
with Charlie. The χ denotes Bob’s Holevo information
about Charlie’s distributed state. Then the final signa-
ture length L required to sign a 1 bit message with εfail
5probability of failure is implicitly given by [19, 20]
εfail ≤ 2 exp
[
− (pe − perr)
2
16
L
]
(2)
provided that security parameter pe − perr > 0, where
perr is an honest player’s mismatch probability, which
can be estimated during the protocol. In other words,
QDS-b is secure against any attack provided that a dis-
honest player causes more mismatches than an honest
player.
The protocol QDS-b performs well over channels with
low loss and low excess noise, but in order to reach feasi-
ble signature lengths over realistic channels we will em-
ploy the postselection technique [21]. To our knowledge
this is the first time this technique has been leveraged
in the context of QDS. Alice will discard measurement
outcomes for which she has a large probability of mis-
match, thereby reducing perr. Since a forger will attack
the sender (Tx) of quantum states rather than Alice, the
probability pe is unaffected by postselection. The se-
curity parameter pe − perr may then be readily altered
simply by choice of postselection region. The full posts-
election calculation is found in Appendix B.
The experimental implementation of the protocol is
presented in Sec. IV, and the signature length L required
to sign a 1 bit message to εfail chance of failure is given
in Sec. V.
2. The QSS-b protocol
A secret-sharing scheme allows for Alice to distribute a
classical secret between recipients Bob and Charlie. Bob
and Charlie should be able to perfectly reconstruct the
secret when they behave honestly, while either Bob or
Charlie working alone should gain no information.
Although some existing classical secret-sharing
schemes are already information-theoretically secure
[22], they encounter problems when distributing the
shares of the secret across insecure channels, and may
fall prey to an eavesdropper with a sufficiently powerful
quantum computer. A potential solution is to employ
a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol which uses
quantum resources in order to share the classical secret
[23, 24]. For example, the scheme put forward in
Ref. [23] relies on large multipartite entangled states
for distillation of keys between the dealer, Alice, and a
degree of freedom shared between recipients. In another
protocol [24] security is reached via a “round-robin”
distribution stage with each player interacting with the
same transmitted quantum state.
Crucially, unlike these approaches which require dedi-
cated hardware setups or distribution of large entangled
states, the QSS-b protocol presented here accomplishes
the secret-sharing task using only distribution of QPSK
coherent states and heterodyne detection, and thus forms
an integral part of our first agile system QDS-b-QSS-
b-CV-QPSK, Fig. 3. We additionally demonstrate in
Sec. V, that QSS-b attains a larger key rate than an
informational-theoretically secure classical secret sharing
scheme performed over pairwise QKD-encrypted chan-
nels.
In the QSS-b protocol, the dealer (Alice) is assumed
honest, while either one of the Bob or Charlie may be
dishonest. Additionally, a dishonest fourth player, Eve,
may be present. For now we assume that a dishonest
Bob/Charlie will send states only from the QPSK alpha-
bet, though this could be relaxed in future work.
The protocol QSS-b runs as follows:
1) Bob and Charlie send sequences of coherent states
to Alice, which are independently and randomly cho-
sen from the QPSK alphabet. Alice performs hetero-
dyne measurement of phase and records her outcomes
AB , AC ∈ C. Bob and Charlie keep a record, XB , XC , of
which states they have sent.
2) Alice forms a variable XA ' F (AB , AC) which is some
function F of her measurement results. She then encodes
the secret using the XA, and makes the encoded secret
publicly available.
3) Later, when Alice wishes to allow Bob and Charlie
to reconstruct the secret, she leaks the function F and
enough information to perform a reconciliation procedure
between her XA and the XA ' F (XB , XC) generated
by Bob and Charlie. The reconciliation proceeds as in
regular QKD.
4) Bob and Charlie, by working together to form and
reconcile F (XB , XC), gain a copy of Alice’s key. Thus
they are able to decrypt her message.
The protocol should prevent dishonest players from re-
constructing the secret unless they collaborate with the
honest player. Specifically, they are forced to collaborate
by Alice’s choice of F which requires information from
both players to reach the key. The function F can be
arbitrarily chosen and optimized over, though for con-
creteness in the remainder of this work we will assume
that F is linear.
The security proof for QSS-b is found in Appendix C.
The main security result is a calculation of the key rate
κ generated between Alice and a Bob-Charlie collabora-
tion. The key rate corresponds to the number of secure
key bits which which may be encrypted per channel use,
i.e. after both Bob and Charlie have sent a state. One
channel use thus corresponds to distribution of two co-
herent states.
In the the presence of dishonest Eve and honest
Bob/Charlie the key rate κ is given by the following
Devetak-Winter bound [23, 25]
κ ≥ I (XB , XC : XA)− χ (XA : E) (3)
relating the mutual information I between Bob/Charlie’s
classical information XB,C and Alice’s information XA,
and the Holevo information χ which Eve’s quantum sys-
tem E holds about XA.
6More general bounds to guard against dishonest
Bob/Charlie are given in the Appendix. The QSS-b pro-
tocol is implemented in Sec. IV, and the key rate to allow
for secure secret-sharing is given in Sec. V.
B. Second agile system QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK
In addition to our first agile system described above,
which is capable of readily switching between QDS and
QSS tasks, we will demonstrate that cryptographic proto-
cols which already exist in the literature may be viewed
through an agile lens. We therefore turn to consider a
second agile system, denoted QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK,
which is capable of performing either QDS or QKD tasks
in a “forward”-configuration, Fig. 3.
A QDS protocol in which Alice sends quantum coher-
ent states was previously considered in Ref. [19]. There,
it is Bob and Charlie who form eliminated signatures,
and check for mismatches between their eliminated sig-
natures and Alice’s declaration of which states she sent.
We here denote this protocol QDS-f .
To go beyond [19] we apply the postselection technique
to QDS-f , which decreases the number of quantum states
L required to sign a message, particularly in the presence
of channel noise. Since (in contrast to QDS-b) it is now
Bob and Charlie who heterodyne, rather than Alice, both
terms pe and perr now change with the choice of posts-
election region. The effects of postselection on QDS-f ,
and key steps from the security proof, are detailed in
Appendix B.
Finally, we round-off the second agile system by not-
ing that the discrete-modulation QPSK QKD protocol,
analysed e.g. in Ref. [26], may be readily implemented
using the same hardware setup as QDS-f without requir-
ing reconfiguration. This protocol, which we here denote
QKD-f , may be performed between either Alice-Bob or
Alice-Charlie. The full security proof is found in Ref. [26],
and we display the estimated maximum rate of secure key
generation for our system under QKD-f in Section V.
IV. EXPERIMENT
Two optical sender (Tx) and receiver (Rx) hardware
modules as shown in Fig. 4 are used to experimentally
investigate the performance of the four different pro-
tocols QDS-f , QKD-f , QDS-b and QSS-b. Depending
on the configuration required by each of our two agile
systems, Tx and Rx are interpreted as taking on the
communication roles indicated in Fig. 3, while sharing
either a 2 km or 20 km SMF-28 optical fiber link.
Sender module (Tx): A PurePhotonics PPCL-300
external cavity diode laser (ECDL) with a linewidth of
15 kHz tuned to a wavelength of 1550 nm acts as an opti-
cal carrier. Using a Fujitsu DP-QPSK 40 Gbps LiNbO3-
integrated I/Q modulator, driven at a rate of 1 GHz
- -
PX
Rx OSCPCTx
ECDL
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VOA
50:50 
shared LO
pol. c. IQM
PC
90°h
AWG
pol. c.
FIG. 4. Left: The sender (Tx) and receiver (Rx) modules
used to perform four distinct quantum protocols, assuming
different communication roles A, B or C as shown in Fig. 3.
ECDL: external-cavity diode laser, iso: isolator, VOA: vari-
able optical attenuator, IQM: I/Q modulator, pol.c.: polar-
ization controller, AWG: arbitrary waveform generator, LO:
local oscillator, 90◦h: 90◦ hybrid, OSC: oscilloscope.
by a Keysight M8195A arbitrary waveform generator
(AWG), the sender randomly prepares pulses of coherent
states chosen from the QPSK alphabet {|±α0〉, |±iα0〉}.
These states are attenuated to a chosen output ampli-
tude α < α0 with a variable optical attenuator and sent
to the receiver.
Receiver module (Rx): The receiver module inter-
feres the incoming signal with a local oscillator in an
integrated Kylia COH24-X 90◦ hybrid and performs het-
erodyne detection of the electric field quadratures X and
P for each state using two Discovery DSC-R412 bal-
anced optical receivers with an analog 3 dB-bandwidth
of 20 GHz. For the purposes of this demonstration, the
local oscillator is sourced from the carrier laser and trans-
mitted to the receiver using an additional fiber. The
optical receiver outputs are digitized and processed on a
Tektronix DPO77002SX digital sampling oscilloscope us-
ing a sampling rate of 25 GS/s. Digital signal processing
(DSP) is applied to the quadrature time traces, consist-
ing of a high-pass filtering operation to eliminate low-
frequency noise components and a phase recovery step
using reference states.
The experiment was realized by connecting Tx and Rx
using standard single mode fiber spools with two different
lengths: 2 km or 20 km, corresponding to −0.65 dB and
−4.75 dB loss, respectively.
Experiments were performed for different modulation
amplitudes α, as indicated in Tab. I. For each state ex-
change, a total of 1.92× 106 states were sent in frames
of 64, with 4 bright phase reference states at the start
of each frame. Of those, 1.54× 106 states or 80.2 % re-
mained after the DSP. A phase space diagram of the
quantum state constellation and a section of the mea-
sured raw data can be seen in Fig. 5.
7FIG. 5. Top: Raw quadrature data traces produced by our
quantum communication system running quadrature phase
shift keying (QPSK) modulation. Bottom: A resulting phase-
space constellation diagram after digital signal processing
(DSP) has been applied to the raw data. Shaded circles indi-
cate the means and variances of the coherent states sent and
received, including quantum key states (green) and auxiliary
phase reference states (red).
V. RESULTS
The agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK has been in-
vestigated over the 2 km fiber link with average α¯ = 0.64
and an excess noise in the channel of 2.7 % in the lab-
oratory conditions that represent the first targeted im-
plementation of an agile quantum communication sys-
tem. We obtain practical figures of merit for each of the
protocols (5.7 ms to sign a 1-bit message for QDS-b and
2κ = 0.3726 key rate for QSS-b), listed in Tab. I. The pro-
tocol QSS-b has also been investigated in several 20 km
experimental runs for different α and different levels of
excess noise with key rate up to 2κ = 0.1058, completing
the first demonstration of our practical CV QSS, Fig. 6
The second agile system QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK
has been investigated over a 2 km laboratory fiber link
and in several runs over 20 km for different α and differ-
ent levels of excess noise in order to explore performance
at larger distances, which are less favorable for CV com-
munication systems. Alongside the agility aspects, this
experiment has demonstrated the fastest to-date QDS
system at intra-city distances, allowing to sign a 1-bit
message in less than 0.05 ms over a 2 km fiber link. It
has also allowed for a secure performance of the agile
system at 20 km distance with feasible signature lengths,
Fig. 7, with signing times close to the recent best DV
experiments, Fig. 8, and with maximum calculated key
rates κ = 0.1024 for QKD-f .
We detail and benchmark the different aspects of the
experimental performance of the two agile systems in
what follows.
FIG. 6. Performance of agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-
QPSK. Top: QDS signature lengths under protocol QDS-b
with an entangling-cloner attack. The signature lengths at
a distance of 2 km remain modest both in the ideal (above)
and experimental realizations (Tab. I), and the system is ro-
bust to choice of α. Bottom: Maximum calculated QSS key
rates under protocol QSS-b with a dishonest Eve performing
a beamsplitter attack, and either Bob or Charlie dishonest.
The key rate is robust to variations in α, and remains large
even for our 20 km channel. Solid (red), dashed (blue), dot-
dashed (orange) and dotted (green) lines correspond to the
performance deduced by parameters from experimental runs
1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Vertical grid lines depict loss levels
over experimental channels A and B, corresponding to fiber
lengths 2 km (0.65 dB loss) and 20 km (4.75 dB loss).
8Experiment QDS - b QDS - f QSS - b QKD - f
Run d [km] α¯ [
√
snu ] ξ [%] L [bits−1] t [ms] L [bits−1] t [ms] 2κ κ
1 2 0.64 2.7 5.70×106 5.7 4.79×104 0.048 0.3726 0.3479
2 20 0.67 1.9 - - 2.26×109 2260 0.1058 0.1024
3 20 0.55 2.1 - - 1.37×108 137 0.0858 0.0840
4 20 0.64 1.7 - - 2.08×108 208 0.1004 0.0976
TABLE I. Figures of merit for the experimental runs. QDS signature lengths (L) and signing times (t) required to sign a 1-bit
message for security level of ε = 0.01%. The QSS and QKD key rates correspond to the maximum estimated number of bits
of secure key which may be generated per use of the quantum channel. In QSS-b, one channel use corresponds to distribution
of two quantum states, one from Bob and one from Charlie, and so we display 2κ for fair comparison with QKD.
A. Settings for the system runs
We performed the experiment detailed above over two
different channels which we denote channel A and chan-
nel B, corresponding to 2 km fiber length and 20 km
fiber length, respectively. During the experiment, mea-
surement outcomes corresponding to parameters detailed
in Tab. I were obtained. Each element of the QPSK al-
phabet had slightly different sending amplitude in each
experiment, and we display the average amplitude α¯ in
the table. The excess noise ξ above the shot-noise was
calculated for each quadrature x, p and ξ = max{ξx, ξp}
was taken as a worst-case scenario. We now process our
measured data with reference to each of the four quantum
protocols and thus demonstrate quantum crypto-agility
of our two systems.
B. First agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK
In the first agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK, the
sender module Tx is understood to play the role of either
Bob or Charlie, while Rx plays the role of Alice. Signa-
ture lengths are calculated using data parameters from
Tab. I with the postselection region R (∆r) optimized
at each channel loss, see Appendix. B. In the ideal case,
the probability perr is calculated using Eq. (B3) under
the model described in Appendix B, which includes both
channel excess noise ξ, ascribed to Eve, and a detector
efficiency of 50% which Eve cannot exploit. We allow
Eve to perform the entangling cloner attack [19] which
is expected to be optimal in the limit α → 0, and close
to optimal for the small α’s used here, and probability
pe may be estimated as in Appendix A once the worst-
case α and ξ have been estimated from data. The ideal
signature lengths for QDS-b are displayed in Fig. 6.
More realistic signature lengths may be calculated by
taking into account in the estimate of pe the actual am-
plitudes and sending probabilities which Tx sent, rather
than an average, and by measuring perr directly from the
output of Rx. The perr calculated this way takes into ac-
count all sources of detector loss and trusted noise which
will increase perr, and thus the measured L will be larger
than those in Fig. 6.
For experimental run 1 over the 2 km channel under
entangling-cloner attack, signature length L = 5.7× 106
is required to sign a single bit, Tab. I. However, even at
20 km, QDS-b could still be made secure by choosing a
large postselection region with ∆r  1, but for loss levels
more than ∼ 2 dB the signature length required becomes
impractically large.
For our secret-sharing protocol QSS-b, Fig. 6, the
Holevo information is calculated by estimating channel
transmission T and excess noise ξ from the data and
assuming the dishonest players perform a beamsplitter
attack. The mutual information is calculated by calcu-
lating the probability p (x|αk) of measuring x ∈ C at the
output when coherent state αk was sent, noting again
that the realistic non-identical amplitudes and probabil-
ities of the implemented QPSK alphabet may be readily
included. Further details are found in Appendix C. Max-
imum QSS key rates, calculated from measured experi-
mental parameters, are displayed in Tab. I, where we see
that twice the key rate, 2κ is greater than the comparable
key rate κ for QKD-f (remembering that one channel use
is defined differently between QKD and QSS). In other
words, QSS-b outperforms pairwise QKD, by consuming
fewer quantum resources. Protocol QSS-b is therefore
preferable over a classical information-theoretically se-
cure protocol performed over pairwise QKD-encrypted
channels.
C. Second Agile system QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK
For the second agile system, QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-
QPSK, Tx plays the role of Alice while Rx plays either
Bob or Charlie. The performance of protocol QDS-f is
displayed in Fig. 7 under a beamsplitter attack. The
excess noise and detector efficiency from experiment are
included, and pe and perr are calculated via analogous
methods to QDS-b, above. We see that in the ideal anal-
ysis of Fig. 7, protocol QDS-f allows for very small sig-
nature lengths O
(
104
)
at 2 km, while at 20 km the pre-
9FIG. 7. Calculated performance of agile system QDS-f -
QKD-f -CV-QPSK. Top: QDS signature lengths under proto-
col QDS-f under a beamsplitter attack. Signature lengths L
at 20 km (channel B) remain feasible with both ideal (above)
and experimental realizations (Tab. I). At 2 km (channel A)
the protocol requires small signature lengths and thus is the
fastest QDS protocol over comparable distances, Fig. 8. Bot-
tom: Calculated maximum QKD key rates under protocol
QKD-f with a beamsplitter attack. Both: Vertical grid lines
denote channel losses at which we have performed an exper-
iment. Solid (red), dashed (blue), dot-dashed (orange) and
dotted (green) lines correspond to experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4,
respectively, and vertical grid lines depict loss levels over ex-
perimental channels A and B, corresponding to fiber lengths
2 km (0.65 dB loss) and 20 km (4.75 dB loss).
dicted lengths are still very modest at O
(
106
)
.
For small channel loss the required L is roughly invari-
ant over a broad range of α, which suggests that QDS-f
is robust to experimental differences, and is thus easy
to implement on an agile system alongside future alter-
native cryptographic protocols which may require more
restrictive choice of α. For large channel loss however
the choice of α becomes increasingly important, but us-
ing for example the mean α¯ = 0.55 and ξ = 2.1% from
experimental run 3, QDS-f is predicted to remain se-
cure even down to 20 dB loss with still-feasible signature
lengths O
(
109
)
, which would allow a one-bit message to
be signed in approximately one second.
A more realistic signature length may be calculated
by using the perr directly measured from the output of
Rx, which includes all noise sources and detector ineffi-
ciencies. This results in the signature lengths which are
displayed in Tab. I. Crucially, they remain highly fea-
sible over the metropolitan distances where continuous-
variable cryptography is expected to be effective. Of par-
ticular note is the L = 47, 887 required to securely sign
a 1 bit message over 2 km fiber, which to our knowledge
makes QDS-f the fastest ever demonstration of a QDS
protocol, requiring just 0.047 ms to sign a message at our
1 GHz sending rate, Fig. 8.
The calculated maximum secure key rates under pro-
tocol QKD-f are plotted in Fig. 7 under a beamplitter
attack. The performance of the protocol agrees with
Ref. [26] over comparable parameter regimes, while the
QPSK amplitudes employed in our experiment are close
to optimal. Calculated maximum key rates, deduced
from experimental parameters, are displayed in Tab. I.
Finally, we want to note that key rates in a concrete
implementation will depend on a number of parameters.
For example, error correction in CV QKD can be compu-
tationally very demanding and will limit the obtainable
key rate. In an agile system, therefore, one should resort
to the protocol with the least demand on resources for a
given task.
VI. CONCLUSION
Agile quantum cryptography allows the introduction
of a layer abstraction between the quantum optical hard-
ware and the protocol layer based on firmware and soft-
ware. To underpin this concept, we have experimentally
demonstrated that the same quantum sender and receiver
can be utilized independent of the protocol run on top
of it. This allows future quantum cryptography systems
to be optimized towards agility and to explore how this
concept can be applied to already existing ones. The
proposed layer abstraction could potentially be further
developed through standardization groups.
For the demonstrations we have utilized a continuous-
variable quantum communication system that is almost
exclusively built from commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
telecom components. This makes it inherently compati-
ble with telecom networks and allows C-band operation
and high sending rates, since telecom components for
coherent communication are optimized for GHz sending
rates, even ranging up to 100 GHz as the state of the
art. This setup has been operated at a sending rate of
1 GHz, however there is no known fundamental limit to
these rates. The current limitation is the electronic noise
of the coherent detection unit, which can be further op-
timized in future works.
The continuous-variable protocols investigated were
quantum digital signatures (QDS), quantum secret shar-
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FIG. 8. Time required to sign a one-bit message, and the
corresponding channel lengths, for several recent QDS pro-
tocols. At the short distances (∼ 2 km) favoured by the
continuous-variable platform, our QDS-f and QDS-b allow
for signing times of less than 0.05 ms and 6 ms, respectively,
improving previous results in CV (a) and discrete-variable
systems (b). At at 20 km QDS-f has signing time com-
parable to recent DV QDS systems (c)-(e). Protocols de-
picted: Red triangles - current paper. (a) Free-space CV QDS
[20]. (b) Unambiguous-state-elimination-based QDS [27]. (c)
Differential-phase-shift-based QDS [14]. (d) GHz BB84 QDS
[17]. (e) Early QDS-QKD “agile” system with measurement-
device-independent capabilities [18].
ing (QSS) and quantum key distribution (QKD). We
have shown for the first time that postselection can be
utilized for QDS and have proven its enhanced robust-
ness to noise and to channel loss. Postselection on QDS
measurement outcomes decreases the required signature
lengths and thus allows us to demonstrate the shortest
signing time for realistic distances of 2 km and sign-
ing times comparable to recent discrete-variable QDS
protocols over 20 km. Furthermore the security of the
QDS protocols has been proven for forward and back-
ward sending configurations, enabling them to be used
in both of the agile systems presented in this paper.
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Appendix A: QDS-b security proof
Recall that a QDS protocol must be secure against re-
pudiation and forgery, and it should be robust and suc-
ceed if all players are honest. We will prove the security
of our protocol against each of these, and finally derive
Eq. (2), which implicitly defines the main figure of merit
of a QDS protocol, the signature length L required to
sign a 1 bit message.
During a repudiation attack, Alice will try to cause
Bob and Charlie to disagree about whether her message
is genuine. Security against repudiation follows along
similar lines to [19, 20, 27], and we reproduce key details
below for completeness.
We assume that Alice is free to manipulate her declared
AmB,C , and she has full control over the mismatch rates
pB (pC) with respect to states which she originally sent
to Bob or Charlie, and the pB,C may even be chosen to
be zero.
After swapping, step three of the protocol, Bob and
Charlie both possess two half-signatures, each of length
L/2, consisting either of states which they held originally
or which they received during swapping. Alice succeeds
in her repudiation attack if Bob accepts both of his halves
as genuine, and Charlie rejects at least one of his halves as
fake. Therefore the probability of successful repudiation
is given by
εrep = P [(A ∩B) ∩ (C ∪D)]
where A (B) denotes the event that Bob accepts
on his first (second) half, and C (D) denotes
the event that Charlie rejects on his first (sec-
ond) half. Now, using probability inequalities
P (X ∩ Y ) ≤ min {P (X) , P (Y )} and P (X ∪ Y ) ≤
P (X) + P (Y ) and Hoeffding’s inequalities [28], we
see that min {P (A) , P (B)} ≤ exp
[
− (p− sB)2 L
]
and
P (C) + P (D) ≤ 2 exp
[
− (sC − p)2 L
]
, where p :=
max {pB , pC}.
Therefore we arrive at
εrep ≤ min
{
2 exp
[
− (p− sB)2 L
]
, 2 exp
[
− (sC − p)2 L
]}
≤ 2 exp
[
− (sC − sB)2
4
L
]
provided that sB < sC , and where in the second inequal-
ity we have taken p = (sB + sC) /2 in order to maximize
εrep.
A QDS protocol is robust if it succeeds when all parties
are honest. Even in this case there is a probability perr of
mismatch, owing to the non-orthogonality of the QPSK
alphabet. Since sB < sC , an honest message is more
likely to be rejected by Bob than Charlie, so we bound
this probability. The message will be rejected if Bob
detects more than sBL/2 mismatches on either half of
his eliminated signature. Using Hoeffding’s inequalities
this occurs with probability
reject ≤ 2 exp
[
− (sB − perr)2 L
]
provided that sB > perr, i.e. Bob’s mismatch threshold
is greater than the honest mismatch rate.
In a forging attack, an eavesdropper will aim to min-
imize their mismatch probability with respect to either
of the XmB,C generated by Bob and Charlie. Since Bob
already knows half of XmC (the information which Bob
himself forwarded), and since sB < sC , the most danger-
ous forger is a dishonest Bob. He is therefore assumed
to eavesdrop on Charlie’s distribution of quantum states,
and tries to gain information about the L/2 signature
elements which Charlie generated himself.
Using Hoeffding’s inequalities as in Ref. [19] we see
that a forging attack succeeds with probability
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εforg ≤ 2 exp
[
− (pe − sC)2 L
2
]
when pe > sC , and therefore all that is required is to
bound pe, which we now do.
Consider the jth signature element. Charlie holds some
cj denoting which state from the QPSK alphabet he
sent. Bob will declare an eliminated signature element,
Bj =
{
b1j , b
2
j
}
which is chosen to minimize pe. The b
1
j , b
2
j
correspond to adjacent elements of the QPSK alphabet.
A mismatch occurs if b1j = cj or b
2
j = cj . Additionally,
we assume that Bj is the result of some optimal strategy
involving Bob’s quantum system, Bj .
We define an error variable Ej which takes the value
1 if a mismatch occurs, and 0 otherwise. Then pe ≡
P (Ej = 1), and the Shannon entropy H (Ej) = h (pe) is
the binary entropy, since |Ej | = 2. Now, consider the
conditional entropy H
(
Ej , b
1
j , b
2
j |cj
)
. Via the chain rule
for conditional entropies,
H
(
Ej , b
1
j , b
2
j |cj
)
= H
(
b1j , b
2
j |cj
)
where we have used the fact that once b1j , b
2
j and cj are
known, Ej is uniquely determined. Using the chain rule
on H
(
Ej , b
1
j , b
2
j |cj
)
again, but for a different variable, we
get
H
(
Ej , b
1
j , b
2
j |cj
)
= H
(
b1j , b
2
j |Ej , cj
)
+H (Ej |cj)
≤ H (b1j , b2j |Ej , cj)+ h (pe)
since conditioning can never increase entropy. Therefore,
by expanding the variable Ej ,
H
(
b1j , b
2
j |cj
) ≤ (1− pe)H (b1j , b2j |Ej = 0, cj)
+peH
(
b1j , b
2
j |Ej = 1, cj
)
+ h (pe) .
Now, H
(
b1j , b
2
j |Ej = 0, cj
) ≤ log2 (2) = 1, and similarly
for Ej = 1, and so
H
(
b1j , b
2
j |cj
) ≤ 1 + h (pe) . (A1)
Finally, we expand the conditional entropy in terms of
the joint entropy and the mutual information,
H
(
b1j , b
2
j |cj
)
= H
(
b1j , b
2
j
)− I (b1j , b2j : cj)
≥ 2− χ (b1j , b2j : cj) (A2)
where we have used the fact that a priori there are four
choices for the pair b1j , b
2
j , and where χ is the Holevo
information [29]. Combining Eqs. (A1), (A2) we arrive
at Eq. (1) from the main paper.
Once pe and perr are bounded for the protocol, the
probability εfail that the protocol fails can be found. For
concreteness, we assign equal probability to the failure of
the protocol either by allowing a forging or repudiation
attack, or by aborting when all players are honest, that
is
εfail = εforg = εrep = εreject
and by choosing sB = perr + (pe + perr) /4; sC = perr =
3 (pe − perr) /4, in order to satisfy the second two equal-
ities, we arrive at Eq. (2) from the main paper
εfail ≤ 2 exp
[
− (pe − perr)
2
16
L
]
(A3)
when perr < sB < sC < pe.
Finally, we note that under a beamsplitter attack,
Eve’s a priori state is
ρE =
3∑
k=0
|√1− Tαk〉〈
√
1− Tαk| (A4)
when states |αk〉 from the QPSK alphabet are sent
through lossy channel with transmittivity T. Eve’s a
posteriori state is simply ρkE = |
√
1− Tαk〉〈
√
1− Tαk|,
from which her Holevo information is calculated as
χ = S (ρE)−
3∑
k=0
p (k)S
(
ρkE
)
. (A5)
with S the Von Neuman entropy.
Appendix B: Postselection in CV QDS
In the QKD context it has been known for some time
that postselection will improve key rates in the presence
of excess noise, and is even a requirement for distilling a
key for T < 1/2 in the direct-reconciliation regime [21].
We are thus motivated to apply postselection to protocol
QDS-b in order to allow a message to be securely signed
over a larger range of channel parameters.
To apply the postselection technique, recipients in the
protocol will simply disregard unfavourable measurement
outcomes, i.e. outcomes for which a dishonest player is
deemed to have too much knowledge, or for which the
probability of honest mismatch is too high. We thus de-
fine a region R of phase-space, and only allow honest
players to accept measurement outcomes x /∈ R. The
region R is then varied to increase the range of channel
parameters for which the QDS protocols are secure, and
to minimize signature length L.
To be concrete, in this work we take R parameterized
by ∆r,∆θ in polar coordinates in phase-space. This is
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the same postselection region considered in the recent
QKD work Ref. [30], but if desired, more general regions
may be readily considered.
We will now consider how this application of postse-
lection affects security of QDS-b and QDS-f .
1. QDS-b
The crucial quantity which controls the security of a
QDS protocol is gsec := pe − perr, which intuitively de-
scribes how much worse a dishonest player should fare
than an honest player. The protocol is secure provided
that gsec > 0. We therefore must consider how postse-
lection affects gsec.
In QDS-b, pe does not depend on Alice’s heterodyne
measurement, since a dishonest player will attack the
sender (Tx) of the quantum states, and so pe is unaffected
by postselection. We thus calculate the transformation
of perr.
Although in an actual run of the protocol the honest
mismatch rate perr should be estimated from a publicly
disclosed subset of AmB,C and X
m
B,C , it is illustrative to
consider how perr may be calculated theoretically. When
Charlie sends state |αk〉 through a lossy channel, trans-
mittivity T, then Alice receives outcome x ∈ C with prob-
ability
p (x|αk) = 1
pi
exp
(
−|x−
√
T
2
αk|2
)
. (B1)
Thus, the probability of eliminating the state |α〉, when
no postselection is used, is
perr =
∫ ∞
0
r dr
∫ 3pi/2
pi/2
dθ p
(
reiθ|α)
=
1
2
erfc
(√
T
2
|α|
)
. (B2)
Postselecting on the region R, the mismatch probability
becomes
perr (∆r,∆θ) =
1
N
∫ ∞
∆r
r dr
(∫ pi+∆θ
3pi/2−∆θ
dθ f (r, θ)
+
∫ pi−∆θ
pi/2+∆θ
dθ f (r, θ)
)
(B3)
with f (r, θ) = p
(
reiθ|α) and N the probability that the
outcome x ∈ C is accepted, i.e. it falls within C\R.
Probability N is calculated analogously to Eq. (B3).
The above analysis follows identically when excess
noise is included, using the requisite formulas from
[19, 26]. Finally, we note that when postselection is used
the signature length L calculated from Eq. (2) should
be rescaled in order to remain a useful figure of merit.
While the normally calculated L counts how many sig-
nature elements are required to sign the message, many
of the states which were sent during the protocol will be
rejected. Including these in our accounting, the figure of
merit is rescaled L → L˜ := L/N . These L and L˜ may
now be directly compared between protocols, and thus in
Sec. V we make no distinction between L and L˜.
2. QDS-f
Probability perr varies identically to QDS-b when post-
selection is included, but now since a dishonest player’s
declaration depends on an honest player’s heterodyne
outcome, the probability pe must also vary with R. We
recall that the key security result for QDS-f , taking dis-
honest Bob as the forger, is [19]
h (pe) ≥ 1− χ (B4)
with χ the Holevo information between Bob’s quantum
system and Charlie’s eliminated signature element. For
the jth signature element in QDS-f this takes the form
χ
(
xj1, x
j
2 : Bj
)
= S
(
ρjB
)
−
∑
xj1,x
j
2
p
(
xj1, x
j
2
)
S
(
ρ
xj1,x
j
2
B
)
.
(B5)
The a posteriori state ρ
xj1,x
j
2
B is the quantum state held
by Bob when Charlie’s eliminated signature element is
xj1, x
j
2, and ρ
j
B is Bob’s a priori state which is mixed
over all eliminated signature elements.
Under the beamsplitter or entangling-cloner attacks
considered in this work, the conditional state ρjB|c held
by Bob after Charlie measures c ∈ C may be readily
calculated as in [19]. Then, since Charlie’s eliminated
signature element is entirely determined by the quadrant
in which c lies, the state ρ
xj1,x
j
2
B is caclulated by mixing
ρjB|c over an entire quandrant of phase-space
ρ
xj1,x
j
2
B =
1
N
∫
ρjB|c d
2c
= 4
∫ ∞
0
r dr
∫ pi/2
0
ρB|reiθ dθ (B6)
where N is the required normalization factor, and where
in the second line we have explicitly shown the calculation
for a particular eliminated signature element.
Then we see that when postselection over region
R (∆r,∆θ) is used, Eq. (B6) should be modified
ρ
xj1,x
j
2
B =
1
N
∫ ∞
∆r
r dr
∫ pi/2−∆θ
∆θ
ρB|reiθ dθ (B7)
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with N the same normalization factor as in Eq. (B3).
The a priori state is likewise found by mixing Eq. (B7)
over all quadrants, and thus pe may be calculated. The
figure of merit for QDS-f under postselection is now L˜,
as in the preceding section, though since this may be
directly compared with L in the absence of postselection
we make no distinction in the main body of the paper.
All results presented have the optimal choice of R (∆r),
noting that variations in ∆θ provide only small changes
to signature lengths in both QDS-b and QDS-f , and so
in the main body of the paper we set ∆θ = 0 in order to
focus on the much larger effects of the radial variations.
Appendix C: QSS-b security calculations
We will first demonstrate the security calculation of the
protocol in the presence of an external eavesdropper, with
Bob and Charlie assumed honest. The starting point for
our calculation is
κEve ≥ I (XB , XC : XA)− χ (XA : E) (C1)
denoting the maximum calculated key rate between the
shared variable XB , XC of Bob/Charlie, and Alice’s
XA := F (AB , AC). Eve’s quantum system is denoted
E.
Let b, c denote elements from the QPSK alpha-
bet which are sent by Bob/Charlie. Then the mu-
tual information may be calculated once the prob-
ability p (XA = a|XB = b,XC = c), for Alice to re-
ceive element XA = a conditioned on particu-
lar QPSK states, is known. In the ideal case,
probability p (XB = b,XC = c) = 1/16 since each
of the QPSK states are equally likely, and so
p (XB = b,XC = c|XA = a) may be calculated using
Bayes’ formula. Then, H (XB , XC |XA) is calculated by
integrating p (XA = a)H (XB , XC |XA = a) over all pos-
sible outcomes a, and finally
I (XB , XC : XA) = H (XB , XC)−H (XB , XC |XA)
The Holevo term in Eq. (C1) may be calculated in the
usual way from Eve’s a priori and a posteriori states,
with ρE mixed over all XA, and ρ
a
E Eve’s state when
Alice holds XA = a, with the channel modeled under
either beamsplitter or entangling-cloner attacks.
Before the channel, the total Bob-Charlie state is
ρB,C = ρB⊗ρC , where in the ideal case each ρB (ρC) are
an equally weighted mixture over the QPSK alphabet.
Passing through the channels, ρA,E = ρAB ,EB ⊗ ρAC ,EC
where, for example, under a beamsplitter attack
ρAB ,EB =
1
4
3∑
k=0
|
√
Tβk〉A〈
√
Tβk|
⊗ |√1− Tβk〉E〈
√
1− Tβk|
and similarly for ρAC ,EC . Alice heterodynes on each of
her modes and receives outcomes AB , AC .
Since the function F is in general not injective, Eve’s
state is found by mixing ρE|AB ⊗ ρE|AC over Alice’s mea-
surement outcomes AB , AC to reach the a posteriori
state ρE|XA . Finally, the a priori state is given by
ρE =
∫
d2XA P (XA) ρE|XA (C2)
and so Eve’s Holevo information may be calculated. The
Holevo information under an entangling-cloner attack is
calculated analogously, but now the channel mixes the
input ρB , ρC with one arm of one of Eve’s two entan-
gled two-mode squeezed vacuum states. The remainder
of the calculation proceeds identically, and is shown e.g.
in Ref. [19] in the context of QDS.
Including a dishonest Bob, the key-rate reads
κB ≥ I (XA : XB , XC)− χ (XA : EB) (C3)
where EB is a quantum system shared between Bob and
Eve. The main difference in calculation of both mutual
information and Holevo information terms is that now
the Eve-Bob conspiracy has knowledge about which state
Bob sent, and so Bob’s alphabet should no longer be
mixed over.
A dishonest Charlie is taken into account identically,
and the final key rate, including possibility for either Bob
or Charlie to be dishonest, is given by [23]
κ ≥ min {κB , κC} . (C4)
